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Scientists are rarely immoral and seldom even amoral. The ethical principles that underlie much of
their ownwork are shared with scientists in other countries to amuch greater degree than the cultural
and religious differences among those countries would lead one to expect. Likeme, fewwill have had
any formal training in bioethics; so how might life scientists approach the varied ethical issues that
arise in human embryo and stem cell research?Introduction
The road to human embryonic stem (ES) cells started more
than 50 years ago with a mouse cancer. Leroy Stevens no-
ticed that one mouse strain was always developing testis
tumors. Years of patient work led to the creation of embry-
onal carcinoma (EC) lines, the precursors of mouse ES cell
lines. ES cells are pluripotent: introduced into an early
mouse embryo, they colonize every cell lineage, including
the germ cell lineage (unlike EC cells, which never ‘‘went
germline’’). Homologous recombination in mouse ES cells
allowed genes to be knocked out and replaced. This was
the focus of ES cell research until 1998, when Jamie Thom-
son’s report of the derivation of human ES cells drew world
attention to the potential value of ES cells in cell therapy.
Mouse modelers now began enthusiastically to seek
ways of inducing ES cells in vitro to make neural tissue,
muscle, cartilage, and so forth. Mouse models of human
disease had their conditions ameliorated by treatment
with ES-derived cell preparations. But although human
ES cells were also pluripotent, translation to the clinic has
been slow in coming, partly because human ES cells
grow more slowly and are more difficult to work with than
mouse cells, but also because the derivation of human
ES cells involves the ethically questionable destruction of
early human embryos. Human ES cell research raises
a whole slew of new ethical issues for researchers, and dif-
ferent countries have responded to these ethical dilemmas
with a plethora of different laws and regulations.
Ethics
I am a biologist, not an ethicist. Because I find ethics con-
fusing, I have distinguished in my own mind three different
ethical categories involved in ES cell research: personal
ethics, research ethics, and social ethics. Personal ethics
relates to personal morality, avoiding cheating, dishon-
esty, irresponsibility, but also failure to observe good
practice. By research ethics, I mean the ethics of the ac-
tual research itself: what material is being used, what is
its source, what are researchers doing with it. By social
ethics, I mean what social impact the research might
have. Of course these distinctions are not black and white,but rather they grade into one another, and often an ethical
issue may relate to more than one category.
Personal Ethics
Cheating, to my mind, includes plagiarism as well as fak-
ing. Irresponsibility could lead to premature clinical appli-
cations, either from a very understandable desire to ease
patients’ suffering or perhaps from more morally suspect
motives such as undue competitiveness and/or potential
financial gains. Whatever the motive, any premature clini-
cal application of stem cell therapy could be harmful not
only to individual patients but also to the field as a whole.
Hype, raising patients’ hopes unduly, is also irresponsible,
but when voiced by scientists and doctors it is actually dis-
honest, because they are more aware of the long time pe-
riods involved in translating advances in stem cell science
from the laboratory to the clinic. Failure to observe good
practice involves not only failure to follow the rigorous re-
quirements of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) but
also failure to get informed consent, or giving inadequate
information to patients—too little or sometimes too much.
All of these elements of personal ethics apply to adult




Much of the ethical discussion about using early human
embryos for deriving human ES cells, as well as for other
types of embryo research, revolves around the moral sta-
tus of the early human embryo. There is general agreement
that a new, unique genetic constitution is formed at fertil-
ization. Whether there is a precise moment in the pro-
tracted process of fertilization when this occurs seems to
be of greater interest to politicians and philosophers than
to those biologists who actually study the process. The
question ‘‘When does life begin?’’ is not a meaningful
question to most biologists, since life is a continuum.
Nonetheless, scientists that I have talked to who actually
use donated human embryos in their research do view
them in a rather special light because they are human,Cell Stem Cell 1, July 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 23
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worthless research.
One view of the moral status of the human embryo is
that, from the one-cell stage onward, or from fertilization
onward, the moral value of the embryo is equal to that of
a newborn baby or an adult human being. This is the offi-
cial view of the Roman Catholic Church. It follows that
stem cell derivation, or any other form of destructive inter-
vention, is equivalent to murder and hence ethically imper-
missible. Yet I wonder how many even of that persuasion
would choose the embryos in the burning building test
(‘‘Which would you rescue first, the freezer containing 20
8-cell embryos, or the baby?’’).
In the United States, no federal funding can be used for
deriving new human ES cell lines, but research may be
carried out on any lines derived before August 9, 2001.
There are also five European countries including Germany
in which all human embryo research and ES cell derivation
is prohibited (for a summary of international hES policies,
see http://www.isscr.org/public/regions/index.cfm).
However, human ES cell lines may be imported into the
country and used for research, but only if they were de-
rived before a certain date. For biologists, despite different
individual and cultural views, the consensus on the moral
status of the human embryo is likely to be a developmental
one, namely that the moral value of an embryo increases
as it develops into a fetus, then into a baby. This view, of-
ten for pragmatic rather than philosophical reasons, is
shared by a long list, growing all the time, of countries in
which licensed research on human embryos for worth-
while purposes is legal, and human ES cell lines are per-
mitted to be derived from ‘‘spare’’ embryos donated by
couples undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment
for infertility. If they no longer need the embryos (fresh or
frozen) for their own parental project, the couples have
the choice of donating them for research, just letting
them die by putting them in conditions in which they can-
not survive, or (in some countries) donating them to
another couple. Often couples donate their spare em-
bryos for research, including for derivation of ES cells: if
the stem cells are to be used for research that may even-
tually ease human suffering, this is regarded as an ethical
‘‘good.’’ Any eight-celled embryo seen down a micro-
scope is beautiful, but if it is a human embryo, one views
it with added respect, and it seems unethical to have to
discard it when it could contribute to scientific knowledge
and the reduction of human suffering. Indeed, if there is no
welcoming uterus, that new unique genetic constitution
could still survive in a pluripotent human ES cell line.
Various approaches have been proposed to overcome
the ethical problem of embryo destruction. For example,
in mice, a single cell removed from an early embryo, with-
out destroying the embryo, can give rise to a new ES cell
line if surrounded by existing ES cells and cultured under
appropriate conditions (Chung et al., 2006). Even if this
could be repeated with human cells, it might not circum-
vent the central ethical problem. At that stage, each cell
of a human embryo could be totipotent, in that it could
give rise to an entire individual, so using it instead for mak-24 Cell Stem Cell 1, July 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.ing an ES cell line would be equivalent to using an embryo
for the same purpose and just as impermissible. Others
have argued that genetic modification such that the
embryo would be unable to implant in the uterus might cir-
cumvent the ethical problem, since no potential life would
be destroyed by ES cell derivation (Meissner and Jae-
nisch, 2006; Hurlbut, 2005). To date, none of these ap-
proaches have proved both ethically acceptable and sci-
entifically feasible. To me, serious ethical questions are
raised by the requirement to use large numbers of do-
nated human oocytes to develop and validate (for both
safety and efficacy) any of these procedures, relevant as
they are only to the shrinking minority of countries in which
derivation of ES cell lines from donated frozen embryos is
prohibited.
Another ethically fraught issue is the question of re-
search embryos, that is, embryos produced specifically
for research. In the United Kingdom, following the birth of
the first ‘‘test tube’’ baby, the Committee of Inquiry into Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology was convened by the
British government, chaired by Mary Warnock. Its remit
was to consider the problems of infertility and the implica-
tions of new treatment methods (e.g., IVF) and to advise as
to whether new legislation was required. In its 1984 report,
it was argued that ‘‘if research on embryos is to be permit-
ted at all, it makes no difference whether these embryos
happen to be available or were brought into existence for
the sake of research.’’ Indeed, the embryos themselves
appear no different, and it seems to many of us no less eth-
ical to fertilize a donated oocyte for a worthwhile research
project that can be done in no other way, than to divert an
embryo to a research fate when it was made with a repro-
ductive goal in mind. Research on spare embryos is de-
pendent on contingency, on chance; embryos made for re-
search are specific, dependent on responsible decision. In
practice, embryos made for research by IVF would tend to
be of better quality and developmental potential than the
spare embryos donated by couples in infertility clinics:
the ‘‘best’’ embryos in IVF clinics would be transferred to
the uterus, whereas the spare embryos have usually
been frozen and presumably carry an above-
average complement of genes adversely affecting fertility.
My own view is that it is ethically acceptable to make em-
bryos for research if strictly regulated. The source of oo-
cytes for making research embryos may, however, raise
ethical concerns.
Today, most human embryos made for research are
made not by fertilizing donated oocytes but through so-
matic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), the cloning technique
used to produce Dolly the sheep and other cloned ani-
mals. SCNT involves transferring a nucleus from an adult
somatic cell into a donated oocyte that has had its own
nuclear genome removed. The reconstructed oocyte is
then stimulated to undergo embryonic development.
Why is SCNT regarded as such an important research
goal? The initial enthusiasm was for cell therapy, so-called
‘‘therapeutic cloning,’’ whereby the patient’s nucleus
would be transferred to a donated oocyte and an ES cell
line could subsequently be derived that would carry the
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differentiate into appropriate tissues for treatment of the
patient and would avoid the risk of graft rejection. But
the procedure would be patient specific and immensely
labor intensive, and, since it would require many donated
oocytes, it is now regarded by many as ethically question-
able. Other methods are under development for avoiding
graft rejection, including inducing specific tolerance in
the patient, removing antigenic epitopes from the stem
cells, and building up large enough stem cell banks to
facilitate close matching. Even if it were not feasible for
cell therapy, the use of SCNT to study nuclear reprogram-
ming at the basic level could be immensely valuable if it
enabled somatic cells to be transformed directly into plu-
ripotent stem cells, without the need for oocytes or em-
bryos. The recent work from Yamanaka’s group has sug-
gested the possibility of transforming fibroblasts directly
into ES-like cells (Takahashi and Yamanaka, 2006). Fur-
thermore, patient-specific ES cell lines derived by SCNT
from the somatic cells of patients suffering from complex
diseases such as ALS or diabetes, or from some rare ge-
netic disease with only a few dozen cases worldwide,
would provide material for research that could shed light
on the biochemical and genetic basis of the disease and
perhaps suggest new approaches for therapy.
Nuclear transfer, not of somatic cells but of pronuclei,
could prove valuable for avoiding transmission of mito-
chondrial disease. Transfer of pronuclei between fertilized
eggs was first carried out in mice decades ago (McGrath
and Solter, 1983; Surani et al., 1984) and led to increased
understanding of the importance of genomic imprinting.
Recently, a research project has been licensed in the
United Kingdom to explore the possibility of human pronu-
clear transfer by using nonviable (tripronucleate) eggs dis-
carded by IVF clinics. If the procedure appears feasible
and safe, transfer of both male and female pronuclei
from a fertilized egg into an enucleated donor egg could
allow a woman suffering from a mitochondrial disease to
avoid passing on the defect to her baby. Mitochondria
are transmitted only from the mother. Mitochondrial DNA
defects constitute a not-inconsiderable medical problem,
with 1 in 10,000 of the population affected, resulting in
a wide spectrum of different disease syndromes, some
life threatening. The problem is exacerbated by the wide
variation among an affected woman’s oocytes in the pro-
portion of defective DNA molecules, making genetic coun-
seling extremely difficult. Pronuclear transfer has no con-
nection with SCNT or cloning, as the embryo is derived by
fertilization of the mother’s oocyte by the father’s sperm.
But other ethical issues may arise, principally as regards
safety, as little is known of the interaction between the nu-
cleus and foreign mitochondria in such ‘‘cybrids.’’ In mice,
an effect on protein constitution in the progeny has been
reported (Roemer et al., 1997).
Social Ethics
By social ethics of research, I mean considerations of the
implications for society of any proposed line of research.
Some types of research are prohibited by law, for example(in the United Kingdom and many other countries) repro-
ductive cloning. This is banned not only for safety reasons
but more because of the legal, psychological, and social
problems that would arise if reproductive cloning were
ever to be judged safe for use in our own species and
which have never been adequately discussed and as-
sessed by the public. Modification of nuclear genes to
produce transgenic human embryos is also prohibited in
the United Kingdom and in many other countries. The
laudable aim of replacing defective genes with normal
equivalents is not only risky but in my view is unethical in
that the changes would also affect future generations. It
is not only not feasible at the present time but is rendered
unnecessary by the availability of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD), which allows affected embryos to be dis-
carded rather than transferred to the uterus.
For any research projects that involve making embryos
by fertilization, by SCNT, or by parthenogenesis, there is
a requirement for human oocytes. Donated oocytes are
in short supply for clinical treatment of women who can
produce none of their own (for example, women with
Turner’s syndrome) or whose oocytes are of poor quality
due to advancing age. In the United States, payment to
oocyte donors is regarded as ethically acceptable for clin-
ical use but not for research. Disallowing payment could
be regarded as a form of discrimination, but other ethical
issues that arise include commodification of oocytes and
exploitation of women, given possible risks to the health of
oocyte donors. Short-term risks (e.g., hyperstimulation of
the ovaries) under good clinical conditions are slight and
can be quantified; long-term risks (e.g., cancer), especially
of repeated hormone stimulation over a lengthy period of
time, are unknown (Pearson, 2006).
Other possible sources of oocytes for research include
in vitro maturation of immature oocytes harvested in the
course of IVF cycles, in vitro maturation of primary oocytes
from aborted fetuses or from primordial follicles in adult
ovaries (which has been achieved in mice), SCNT into enu-
cleated oocytes of another species (see below), and oo-
cytes derived from cultured stem cells, reported both
from mouse ES cells (Hubner et al., 2003) and from pig
skin stem cells (Dyce et al., 2006). Whether or not these
stem-cell-derived oocytes can be fertilized and would
prove capable of supporting embryonic development is
not known, but if they could be derived also from human
ES cell lines, they could prove valuable for at least some
future research projects. They would, however, raise is-
sues of social importance if introduced into clinical prac-
tice. If both oocytes and sperm could be produced from
ES cell lines of either sex, single-sex marriages could pro-
duce their genetically own babies, without the need for re-
productive cloning.
Ethically sensitive issues also arise in relation to labora-
tory-based research that combines both human and ani-
mal material. We are accustomed to cardiac patients re-
ceiving pig heart valves, and conversely there are
thousands of transgenic mice that are harbouring human
genes or even whole human chromosomes (e.g.,
the ‘‘Down’s mouse,’’ Epstein et al. [1985]). The use ofCell Stem Cell 1, July 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 25
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nuclei could provide not only experience in the technique
of SCNT but also perhaps valuable disease-specific ES
cell lines for research. The experiments may not work,
but unless they are attempted, we will never know. The
objections seem to be based more on beliefs about public
perception rather than on ethical principles.
As for crossspecies chimeras, in which a single embryo
or adult might contain both human and animal (e.g.,
mouse) cells, there seems no reason to add mouse cells
to human embryos or adults, so it is only human-to-mouse
chimeras that need to be considered. It is common prac-
tice to transfer human stem cells of various sorts to
immunologically handicapped mice to study the differen-
tiation potential of the stem cells in teratomas. Injection of
human ES cells into mouse fetuses in utero or after birth
could be feasible and would again give information on dif-
ferentiation potential. How much information could be ob-
tained by injecting human ES cells into mouse blastocysts
is not clear, but each research project, whether involving
mouse fetuses or blastocysts, would need to be individu-
ally scrutinized both scientifically and ethically, with par-
ticular attention paid to the number of human cells trans-
ferred and the stage at which the host mouse should be
killed for analysis. Almost certainly some human ES cells
will need to be put into some nonhuman host before clin-
ical trials are initiated, to check for tumorigenicity or other
problems. Reluctance to transgress species boundaries
has no place in laboratory-based research.
The Scientist’s Role
Scientists are not ethicists: in my view, they have as little or
as much right to their opinions on the ethics of human ES
cell research as any other citizen. However, they do have
more knowledge. They therefore have an ethical duty to
explain to people what research they are doing and what
the possible implications are for society. They could talk
to schools, to women’s groups, to church groups, to neigh-
borhood groups. They should make themselves available26 Cell Stem Cell 1, July 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.to the media. Scientists working in the biomedical field
are fortunate: what they are doing is of general interest,
and to understand it does not require a knowledge of
higher mathematics. It is a mistake, however, to assume
that the more people understand about a scientific project
and its aims, the less likely they must be to reject it. There is
some evidence to the contrary. If an informed public re-
jects some line of scientific research, we should take
heed: there may be matters of social concern more cogent
than just the ‘‘yuck’’ factor.
Education of the public is not enough. Of course the pub-
lic understanding of science is often woefully inadequate,
but the scientists’ understanding of the public is often
not much better. Let us aim for an informed dialog, and
let us hope that the media will do their best to make sure
that nothing is ‘‘lost in translation.’’
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